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定位:AiSOC 是由 beenuar 开源的 AI 安全运营中心,可自托管,用于摄入安全遥测、检测关联威胁,并由可审计的 AI Agent 调查、人工批准响应。
核心能力
- 内置 7023 条规则库,其中 2538 条可执行,遥测归一化后按规则命中聚合成事件。
- 每个 AI Agent 的提示词与工具调用全程记录,调查推理过程可逐条审计。
- 新威胁情报会重新扫描已收集的历史数据,响应动作须经人工批准后才下发。
- 提供
make smoke冒烟测试,将真实事件沿 Kafka、检测、关联到 Postgres 逐段验证。
适用人群:适合自建 SOC 的安全团队与平台工程师,需 Docker Compose v2、8 GB 内存、20 GB 磁盘,以及 python3 3.9+ 和 bash。
注意:首次运行需下载约 2 GB 模型,仅 make clean 可清除。
位置づけ:AiSOC は beenuar 氏によるオープンソースの AI セキュリティ運用センターです。セキュリティテレメトリを取り込み、脅威の検出・相関を行い、監査可能な AI エージェントが調査して人手の承認を経て対応を提案します。
主な機能
- 7023 件のルールライブラリのうち 2538 件が実行可能で、正規化したテレメトリをルールに照合してインシデントに集約します。
- AI エージェントのプロンプトとツール呼び出しはすべて記録され、調査の根拠を追跡できます。
- 新しい脅威インテリジェンスは既存の履歴を再スキャンし、対応は人間の承認後にのみ実行されます。
make smokeが実イベントを Kafka、検出、相関、Postgres まで通して検証します。
対象読者:SOC を自前で運用するセキュリティチームやプラットフォームエンジニア向け。Docker Compose v2、8 GB メモリ、20 GB ディスク、python3 3.9+ と bash が必要です。
注意:初回実行時に約 2 GB のモデルをダウンロードし、削除は make clean のみです。
정의: AiSOC는 beenuar가 공개한 오픈소스 AI 보안 운영 센터로, 자체 호스팅이 가능하며 보안 텔레메트리를 수집해 위협을 탐지·상관하고 감사 가능한 AI 에이전트가 조사한 뒤 사람의 승인을 거쳐 대응을 제안합니다.
핵심 기능
- 7023개 규칙 라이브러리 중 2538개가 실행 가능하며, 정규화된 텔레메트리를 규칙에 대조해 사건으로 묶습니다.
- AI 에이전트의 프롬프트와 도구 호출이 모두 기록되어 조사 근거를 추적할 수 있습니다.
- 새 위협 인텔리전스는 기존 수집 이력을 다시 스캔하고, 대응은 사람의 승인 후에만 실행됩니다.
make smoke가 실제 이벤트를 Kafka, 탐지, 상관, Postgres까지 통과시켜 검증합니다.
대상 사용자: SOC를 직접 운영하려는 보안 팀과 플랫폼 엔지니어에게 적합합니다. Docker Compose v2, 8 GB 메모리, 20 GB 디스크, python3 3.9+와 bash가 필요합니다.
주의: 첫 실행 시 약 2 GB 모델을 내려받으며, 삭제는 make clean으로만 가능합니다.
What it is: AiSOC is an open-source, self-hostable AI security operations center by beenuar. It ingests security telemetry, detects and correlates threats, investigates them with auditable AI agents, and proposes responses that a human approves.
Key capabilities
- Runs 2538 executable rules from a 7023-rule library, normalizing telemetry and grouping hits into incidents.
- Records every prompt and tool call of each AI agent, so investigation reasoning stays auditable.
- Re-sweeps collected history when new threat intelligence arrives; responses wait for human approval.
make smokeposts a real event and follows it through Kafka, detection, correlation, and Postgres.
Who it is for: Security teams and platform engineers running their own SOC. Requires Docker Compose v2, 8 GB memory, 20 GB disk, python3 3.9+, and bash.
Caveats: The first run downloads a ~2 GB model; only make clean clears it.
README · 详细文档
来源 · 查看原文
AiSOC
An open-source, self-hostable AI Security Operations Center. It ingests your security telemetry, detects and correlates threats, investigates them with AI agents whose reasoning is fully auditable, and proposes responses a human approves.
Technical Guide (PDF) · Docs · Architecture · What actually works · Discussions
What AiSOC does
Telemetry arrives from your security tools. AiSOC normalizes it, runs the 2538 executable rules of its 7023-rule library, groups what fires into incidents, investigates each one with an AI agent whose every prompt and tool call is recorded, and proposes an action. New threat intelligence re-sweeps the history you already collected, and a human approves before anything reaches a vendor.
What it looks like running
Watch the full three minutes — install to AI verdict on one server against the published images, terminal waits shortened and the recording saying so on screen. The stills below are from a v20.1.0 run under the same rules — the recording is older than they are. (step by step · what is real)
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| Alerts — each attributed to the connector that fed it. | Automated triage — the bundled local model's verdict, confidence and rationale, verbatim. |
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| Threat intelligence — the real CISA KEV catalog, minutes after boot, with no API key. | SOC operations — with nothing connected yet, and it says so rather than showing a placeholder. |
Quick start
git clone https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC && cd AiSOC
make up
On Windows, or on a machine with nothing installed yet, one line does the prerequisites too: iwr -useb https://raw.githubusercontent.com/beenuar/AiSOC/main/install.ps1 | iex (curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/beenuar/AiSOC/main/install.sh | bash on Linux and macOS). Without Docker at all, pip install aisoc-sandbox && aisoc-sandbox demo walks one alert through the agent funnel offline in under 30 seconds. Without your own machine, open the repo in GitHub Codespaces and run make up in its terminal. All four end at the same console; only the first three install anything.
The Technical Guide covers this in depth: server sizing, where the model runs, every failure mode with its cause and fix, the REST API, MCP, and every console surface.
Needs Docker Compose v2 with 8 GB memory and 20 GB free disk in the Docker VM, plus python3 (3.9+) and bash; make doctor checks all of it and Installation says what each number was measured against. The first run downloads a ~2 GB model into a volume only make clean clears.
make up also creates .env and generates the fifteen secrets in it — the credential vault, the session signing key, five service-to-service credentials and four datastore passwords — then creates an administrator and prints its password, generated on your machine, shown once and stored nowhere. Lost it? make bootstrap ARGS=--reset-password mints another.
A port already in use does not stop the install. AiSOC publishes on a free one, names what held the old one, and moves the console address with it: 64 seconds to a signed-in console on a bare clone with 5432 and 11434 both taken.
Then prove it works. make smoke posts one real event to the ingest API and follows it through Kafka, detection, correlation and Postgres, then reads the alert back out of the public API. Every stage reports PASS or FAIL:
$ make smoke
[PASS] raw telemetry accepted by ingest
[PASS] event traversed the spine and became an alert
PASS: 10/10 stages
Sign in at the address make up printed. A tenant with nothing connected lands on a setup wizard rather than an all-zero dashboard, and its state is read from your own data so it stays right if you connect a source through the API. The spec is docs/openapi.yaml — interactive docs are off in this production-class stack. Stuck? make doctor, which on a host where you have not run make up yet says exactly that.
Press Load sample data in the wizard. Five scenarios take the same ingest path a real connector uses — not inserted rows — so watching them become alerts means watching the pipeline work. They span low to critical on purpose, because a first run where everything is a crisis teaches you nothing about how triage separates signal from routine. They are attributed to AiSOC in the source column, refuse to load into a tenant that already has real alerts, and do not mark setup complete. (what each step proves) For the larger fixed corpus used by demos and evals, make demo loads a synthetic dataset — the pipeline shape, never a benchmark, a customer or an incident. Every row is is_synthetic = true and labelled in the console.
Connect real data
Push, with a credential from make ingest-token (the tenant comes from it, not a header):
curl -X POST http://localhost:8081/v1/ingest/batch \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H "Authorization: Bearer $AISOC_INGEST_TOKEN" \
-d '{"connector_id":"edr-1","connector_type":"crowdstrike","events":[{"severity":"high",
"title":"Encoded PowerShell from Office","host":"WIN-FIN-01"}]}'
Or pull, by configuring one of 90 click-and-connect data connectors in Settings → Connectors — Splunk, Sentinel, Elastic, CrowdStrike, Okta, AWS and Kubernetes audit among those with vendor-specific normalization and setup docs (coverage). Without a vendor profile a connector still ingests through a generic mapping that resolves host, user and source IP.
A real cloud estate does not hand you its logs over a REST call. Four collectors read the surfaces one actually emits to: a CloudTrail organisation trail on S3 notified over SQS (management events, data events and VPC flow logs), a GCP Pub/Sub subscription on a Cloud Logging sink, an Azure Event Hubs capture, and a syslog/CEF listener. Each keeps a resumable cursor and a bounded per-poll budget, so a backlog applies backpressure instead of flooding ingest.
Bringing existing detections? packages/aisoc-migrate translates Splunk SPL, Sentinel KQL and Elastic EQL and refuses rather than approximating what it cannot carry, because an almost-right rule is harder to find than a missing one: of the 2,005 Splunk rules bundled here 1,734 translate and 1,711 of those are partial (what that means).
How it works
Ingest normalizes to a common shape and stamps an activity projection on every event — actor, action, resource, location, outcome, with actor.kind read from each vendor's own documented field rather than inferred — then Kafka carries it. Then fusion runs 2538 executable detection rules, of 7023 on disk, plus 76 sliding-window rules (73 count across events; 3 match an ordered sequence), applies your tenant's own tuning on top — the disables, floors and suppressions the console writes, so a rule you turned off actually stops firing — and decides what becomes an alert. Correlation groups related alerts, an agent investigates and writes its reasoning to the Investigation Ledger, and a playbook may start from the result. Separately, new threat intelligence sweeps the lake for sightings you already collected, and a hypothesis becomes a hunt without anyone writing a query — the model fills a closed schema and every value is bound as a parameter, so it cannot express a query at all.
A playbook triggered by an alert previews before it acts. Three switches must agree — the deployment, the tenant, the playbook — and every default is off; anything less runs in preview with its plan attached to the alert. An approval step is a durable pause: the run suspends to Postgres, survives a restart, resumes after the approval, and expires with a recorded outcome rather than hanging.
Executable is earned, not declared. A rule joins the compiled ruleset only after a vendor-shaped event is replayed through the real connector and engine and that rule is watched to fire — never inferred from a directory or an enabled: flag. The proof can fail: --prove-gate reverts the Windows connector and requires all 1,687 Windows rules to go silent. It means reachable, not that it detects an attack. Two rules still cannot fire — down from 119, because a rule that could not fire stopped being counted as executable — and both are waiting on a behavioural baseline. The ratchet only moves down. (why 1,362 were refused)
Every answer carries its receipts. The copilot cites each checkable claim to the ledger entry behind it and labels the rest uncited rather than dropping them, and any investigation exports as a signed evidence bundle — byte-identical, prompts as digests, OCSF 1.9.0. (how)
docs/architecture/README.md walks that path one step at a time — eleven steps, five diagrams, every box linking to the code — and mirrors to the docs portal.
Deployment profiles
| Profile | Command | Services | RAM | What you get |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| core | make up | 16 | ~8 GB | The full alerting pipeline: ingest → detect → correlate → alert → triage → console, plus the LLM gateway, a local model, the CISA KEV threat feed, and the connector and response services the agent's vendor tools reach |
| full | make up-full | 22 | ~12 GB | Core plus event lake, entity graph, full-text search, enrichment |
| demo | make up && make demo | 16 | ~8 GB | Core plus labelled synthetic data |
CORE is the smallest deployment that takes a real event and produces a real alert, and it needs no credentials to do either.
The model ships with the gateway. Ollama runs a pinned ~2 GB llama3.2:3b-instruct-q4_K_M sized for CPU-only inference, so make up produces real triage verdicts with real token counts in the Investigation Ledger — not a stub. It is not a frontier model: over 50 alerts it gave triage usable output 44 times before the reply was constrained to JSON and 50 after (method), and the rail labels which path answered. Run it faster with make up-gpu, make up-host-llm, or your own provider from the console (all four). No hosted provider has ever been exercised here — there is no funded key, so per-model rows read not measured rather than zero. (ADR-0006)
One real external feed ships too. services/threatintel polls the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog — public, no API key — into the console's Threat Intelligence page: the one thing in a fresh install that is neither synthetic nor yours.
Evaluation, reflex and replay
The published numbers carry their own provenance. (methodology · real vs synthetic data)
- Every verdict scorecard names the model that actually served it — gateway-attested or self-reported, with an explicit provenance status. A run with missing attribution, zero real calls or a deterministic fallback cannot be advertised as a named model's performance, and a measurement that cannot be bound to an attributed call cannot authorize closures.
- Denominators are published, and the uncomfortable direction wins. Full-cohort recall keeps abstentions and failures in the malicious denominator; closure claims ship with their contamination rate; alert reduction has three labelled figures (75.3% legacy grouping, 33.3% production key, 24.5% on a detection-shaped cohort after a missing identifier was fixed to narrow the group instead of widening it). Unmeasured reads not measured, never
0. - The reflex path is observable — nine named stages from queue delay to verification, and a decision contract carrying supporting evidence, contradictory evidence, missing prerequisites and the escalation reason.
- Replay is time-frozen; re-hunting is labelled. Historical replay enforces evidence cutoffs in the retrieval queries (never by prompt), discloses the model-knowledge limit, and cannot execute real actions — the mutation boundary is the write adapter. Applying new intelligence to old telemetry is a distinct, rehearsable mode, and its discoveries are never counted as predictions at the original event time.
- Model suitability is per task. The matrix grades each configured model on the same locked evidence against a deterministic baseline floor (balanced accuracy exactly 0.250); unfunded rows read not measured, with one-command reproduction against any local OpenAI-compatible endpoint.
AI agents
Agents triage alerts and investigate incidents. What they can and cannot do:
- They read the alert, its correlated siblings, entity context, and prior verdicts for the same signature.
- They call typed tools — lake queries, graph traversals, enrichment lookups. The model picks the tool and passes arguments; it never writes SQL.
- Everything is logged to the Investigation Ledger — prompts, tool calls, citations, verdict, token cost — and exports as a signed bundle.
- Grounding is checked. A verdict citing an indicator the evidence never contained is demoted to human review rather than auto-closed.
- A prompt is validated before it is sent. Raw logs, OCSF payloads and secret-shaped values are refused, not redacted after the fact.
- No vendor is touched without a human, unless a tenant has explicitly granted autonomy for that verb. Every response step is graded against its own capability contract at dispatch, so approving a playbook never authorises whatever its steps happen to contain, and an approver must hold the required permission tier and must not be the person who requested the action.
Project maturity
Stable is defined, and a gate enforces it. It was ungated prose until three rows were found describing coverage that did not exist. A row is Stable only with a check that runs on every pull request with no path filter, drives the real production path against real infrastructure, and has a negative control proven by breaking the thing and watching it go red. (the bar)
| Capability | Status | Tested | Production ready |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ingest → detect → correlate → alert | Stable | E2E + unit | Yes |
| Detection engine (2538 executable rules) of 7023 | Stable | Replay proof | Yes |
| Alert correlation into incidents | Stable | Unit | Yes |
| REST API + web console | Stable | Unit + integration | Yes |
| AI triage + Investigation Ledger | Stable | Live Postgres ledger + a PR-gated local-model agent run. No hosted provider has been exercised | Yes, copilot mode |
| Event lake + hunting (ClickHouse) | Stable | Live ClickHouse on the shipped DDL, with a negative control | Yes, full profile |
| Retro-hunts when new intel arrives | Stable | Live ClickHouse + Kafka with the flag on, with a negative control | Opt-in, full profile |
| 68-hunt YAML library, compiled against tenant events in the lake | Stable | Live ClickHouse: scheduled hunts read tenant data and refuse to fall back to the fixture; all 114 field names the corpus filters on compile, via a lake column or the stored payload | Yes, full profile |
| SCIM 2.0 provisioning | Stable | Live Postgres through the real app: PATCH in both providers' dialects, group membership, deprovisioning proved by its consequences, with a negative control | Yes |
| White-label branding | Stable | Live Postgres: the scheduled report and its covering email carry the organisation's brand, with two negative controls | Yes |
| Usage metering | Stable | Live ClickHouse on the shipped DDL, with a negative control that makes an unscoped meter fail | Yes |
| Entity graph (Neo4j) | Stable | Live Neo4j against the production reader, with a negative control | Yes, full profile |
| Governed response actions | Stable | Live socket: permits, refuses, never leaks a refusal, with a negative control | Human-approved only |
| Alert-triggered playbooks, with a durable approval pause | Stable | Live Postgres: suspend, restart, resume, expiry, with a negative control | Yes — three opt-ins deep, preview by default |
| Per-tenant detection tuning in the live engine | Stable | Live Postgres: tuning written changes what the engine fires, with a negative control | Yes |
| Scheduled connectors | Stable | Live scheduler polls a stub vendor into ingest, with a negative control | Yes |
| UEBA | Stable | Live Postgres: migrations, scoring, persistence, isolation, with a negative control | Yes, full profile |
| Package distribution (npm/PyPI) | Beta | The five PyPI packages resolve at the tree's versions, checked against the live registries in both directions with a self-test; the npm half has no registry state to verify | pip install aisoc-sandbox (and the other four) works today; the three npm packages still need the first-upload NPM_TOKEN, an account action |
What AiSOC is not
- Not a drop-in SIEM replacement. It correlates and investigates; it does not replace long-term log retention and compliance search.
- Not able to see telemetry you have not connected. There is no discovery.
- Not autonomous by default. Response requires explicit policy authorization and a human approver.
- Demo and sample incidents are not real incidents, and benchmark numbers are substrate self-consistency measures, not live agent accuracy — labelled as such wherever published.
Troubleshooting
make doctor checks host tools, memory, disk, every port and each datastore by querying it rather than asking whether its container is up, then prints the command to run next. A container killed by a full Docker VM is named as that, not as the service that happened to die. (the six most common failures)
Security
Secrets are generated per deployment and never committed; connector credentials are encrypted at rest. Services connect to Postgres as a DML-only role, so row-level security actually applies, and tenant isolation is enforced at the query layer in every store. RBAC gates every mutating route, ingest is authenticated, and the default install sends no prompt anywhere — the model runs beside it.
SAML and OIDC sign-in with per-connection tenant and group mapping, SCIM provisioning, and console MFA — TOTP with recovery codes, enforceable per tenant. Attribute conditions, time-boxed elevation and workload identities run inside the one permission path, where a condition can only narrow a permission and never grant one. (SSO · access governance)
A service with no credential refuses to serve rather than serving unauthenticated. The changelog records each fix; report via SECURITY.md.
Developing
make test # unit tests for every service
make smoke # the golden pipeline, against a running stack
make stats # recount every figure this README publishes
Guides: add a connector · add a detection · plugin lifecycle. Every count above is recounted from the tree, and CI fails if this README disagrees.
Funding · Roadmap · Contributing · License
Development is funded and supported by Cyble, who pay for the engineering time behind AiSOC and release it under the MIT licence rather than keeping it. That buys no special treatment here — no Cyble-only features, no gated modules, no telemetry. (full credits)
ROADMAP.md · CONTRIBUTING.md · SECURITY.md · MIT




